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COMMENTARY





A dilemma that many employers and insurance companies find them-
selves mired in when it comes to providing coverage for employees and
insureds is seen in the dispute over experimental treatments. Tensions
ensue as insurers attempt to limit reimbursement for only treatments
proven safe and effective, while patients demand more access to promis-
ing treatments; the employer, if involved, desires to have the appearance
of just being the "good guy" caught in the middle. But with juries award-
ing up to $89.3 million judgments against providers who deny coverage,1
"nervous tremors [are being sent] through the health insurance industry
which is struggling to define limits on coverage of therapies that are ex-
perimental or have only a slight chance of success.",2 Insurance compa-
nies claim they have legitimate concerns when it comes to experimental
treatment, but some argue experimental is "just [the insurance compa-
nies'] euphemism for too expensive." 3
There are various effects of increasing insurance litigation and its result
on public perception. Many health maintenance organizations
("HMOs") are establishing more formal decision-making procedures for
1. In a legal battle that received national attention, attorney Mark Hiepler won an
$89 million verdict against Health Net, the second largest health maintenance organization
in California. Hiepler argued that Health Net wrongfully denied a bone marrow transplant
to his sister, Nelene Fox, a breast cancer victim who died at age 40 in April, 1993. Health
Net filed a motion for a new trial before reaching a settlement in April, 1994 with the Fox
family for an unstated, but presumably large sum. Greg Miller, Lawyer Makes it His Busi-
ness to Fight HMOs, L.A. TIMES, August 16, 1994, (Valley Edition, Business Section), at 3.
2. Erik Eckholm, $89.3 Million Judgment Worries Health Industry HMO declined to
pay for Bone-Marrow Transplant, SACRAMENTO BEE Dec. 30, 1993, at A3.
3. Edmund Sanders, Cancer Victim's Family Wins Suit, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Dec.
29, 1993, at N1.
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determining coverage of experimental procedures. 4  An increasing
number of health insurers now require approval from a medical associa-
tion and/or an independent board of physicians5 before they agree to pro-
vide coverage for an experimental procedure.6 Also, some insurers are
allowing employers to choose between two plans-one that covers con-
troversial new treatments and one in which they are specifically ex-
cluded.7 Coinciding with these effects are the prevailing opinions of
medical experts, insurance industry representatives, and politicians8 as to
how to solve the problem of funding experimental treatment.9
Cancer treatment is one particularly bitter battlefield.'" The debate
surrounding experimental treatment transcends cancer, however, and in-
volves many forms of unproven treatments, as well as alternative treat-
ments," along with the research that is involved in proving the
effectiveness of a procedure. "For years, medical researchers have been
frustrated and confused by refusals of insurance companies to pay some
or all of the charges relating to the care of a patient who has been in-
volved, however peripherally, in a clinical trial or other study.' 2 Be-
cause of this frustration and confusion, it is appropriate to examine
4. Jane Baird, Life, Death, Money: Insurers Balk at "Experimental" Health Treatment,
HOUSTON CHRON., July 10, 1994, at 1.
5. Over the past nine years, Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association has put together a
top-notch team of methodologists who have evaluated for local "Blues" plans some 200
new treatment and diagnostic approaches. Now Kaiser Permanente is joining in the enter-
prise, and the results of the evaluations are going to be sold to other payers - creating a
review mechanism that could have a big impact on demand for technology. Blues Expand
Tech Assessment, HEALTH Bus., Sept. 17, 1993, at 3.
6. Matthew P. Schwartz, "Experimental" Debate is Intensifying, NAT'L. UNDER-
WRITER LIFE & HEALTH, Apr. 24, 1995, at 5.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., John K. Inglehart, Health Care Reform, The Labyrinth of Congress, 329
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1593, 1594-96 (1993).
9. A corresponding debate involves the funding of research to encourage potentially
effective treatment.
10. Steven Findlay, Coverage Denied: Your Treatment Was Expensive, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Dec. 9, 1991, at 81. Many controversies arise when doctors use chemother-
apy drugs, approved for fighting one form of cancer, against other forms of the disease. Id.
11. See, e.g., M.A.J. McKenna, Many Insurers Slow to Cover Alternative Care, AT-
LANTA CONST., May 31, 1995, (Health Watch), at C3. Though surveys indicate one in three
Americans have used some form of alternative medicine, and one in nine has sought the
help of an alternative practitioner, few insurance companies reimburse for those treat-
ments. Id. But see Robin Herman, Therapies Outside the Mainstream, WASH. POST, Au-
gust 1, 1995, (Health Tab), at Z10.
12. Angela R. Holder, Funding Innovative Medical Treatment, 57 ALB. L. REV. 795
(1994).
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experimental treatment and how it is managed by the relevant
participants.
A. The Relevant Issues
As new, high-technology medical procedures advance, insurance com-
panies are in the unenviable position of deciding which procedures will be
covered and what procedures are beyond the scope of their policies.'3
Succeeding these decisions exists much litigation as to whether the treat-
ment in question falls within the exclusionary language in the insurance
policy at issue. While courts have attempted to interpret these exclusions
to decide whether coverage should be provided, it appears that many,
including the public and the courts, do not realize what the dynamics are
in fashioning the policy exclusions. "Beyond the bare facts .... [little is
known] about how insurance companies make their decisions .... 14
There are numerous considerations when dealing with experimental
exclusions. One side, the insurance companies, argues that rationing new
technology is essential for controlling costs. 15 The primary aim of most
insurers is to keep costs down;' 6 if providers were to pay for everything,
"'premiums would go through the roof.""' 7 Insurers claim they are pro-
tecting patients from unnecessary medicine and improving the overall
quality of care,' 8 but many fear that this rationing may "cripple the re-
search and development process and snuff out new treatments before
they are even developed."' 9 On the other side of the arguments are the
insureds who expect their insurers to be there when they need the cover-
age. Policyholders "don't buy a lottery ticket-[they buy] an insurance
policy."20 This matter is a delicate concern-it involves life and death
decisions-and the issues involved have become rather muddled. The
public's perception of the issues are disparate to those in the health care
industry. The central issue often is not whether insurers are justified in
13. Perry C. Papantonis, Note, Experimental Exclusions: Are Insurance Companies
Really Protected? 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs., 217 (1991).
14. Donald W. Light, Life, Death, and the Insurance Company, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED.
498 (1994).
15. Harris Meyer, Reform Debate Skirts Issue of Costly New Technology, 37 AM. MED.
NEWS 1 (1994).




20. Mark Holoweiko, Experimental Treatment: Can You Do the Right Thing Without
Going Broke?, 13 Bus. HEALTH 38 (1995).
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refusing to cover experimental procedures when the contract clearly ex-
cludes them, but how the conclusion is made as to what is experimental,
and who should actually make this determination. 2'
This Commentary examines the procedures surrounding the accept-
ance of experimental treatment-tracking a treatment's movement into
the mainstream of medicine until it becomes considered conventional
treatment, if ever. Specifically, it will explore how experimental treat-
ment begins with a protocol and strives to reach the point at which it
becomes a generally accepted medical procedure, 22 or for some reason
continues to maintain its "experimental" status. The Commentary will
focus on considerations of the insurance industry as it works with compa-
nies in designing health care coverage,23 and how the resulting policy
often is achieved.
While exploring the decisional path of an exclusionary clause, judicial
decision making is examined. Because courts are all too often dragged
into this debate, a review of the judicial approach is necessary. Identify-
ing defects in the current system, which cause obstacles to settlement, will
be accomplished.
Finally, this Commentary will make recommendations regarding how
to relieve the burden of these difficult decisions from the court,24 and
place them into the hands of people who might be better equipped to
make them. Also, a proposal will be made regarding a more efficient
approach to experimental treatment and its supporting research.
21. Mark Freedman, When Insurers Refuse to Pay. 93 BEST'S REV. - LIFE-HEALTH INS.
EDITION 38 (1993).
22. This is the standard that many insurance companies and courts look to in deciding
whether treatment has become conventional and should be covered.
23. While this Commentary will peripherally discuss other methods of coverage, the
focus is primarily on employer sponsored coverage.
24. District Judge Tinder, in his Memorandum Entry of his Opinion in Harris v. Mu-
tual of Omaha Cos., No. IP 92-1089-C, 1992 WL 421489 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 1992), provides
an ideal indication of why judges should be relieved of this burden whenever possible:
Despite rumors to the contrary, those who wear judicial robes are human beings,
and as persons, are inspired and motivated by compassion as anyone would be.
Consequently, we often must remind ourselves that in our official capacities, we
have authority only to issue rulings within the narrow parameters of the law and
the facts before us. The temptation to go about, doing good where we see fit, and
to make things less difficult for those who come before us, regardless of the law, is
strong. But the law, without which judges are nothing, abjures such unlicensed
formulation of unauthorized social policy by the judiciary.
Id. at *1.
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II. THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
"As in other areas of uncertainty, it is often desirable to transfer the
financial consequences of loss to some person or group of persons."25
The usual procedure involves an insured (the person buying the contract)
entering into an insurance arrangement with an insurer who assents, in
return for the payment of a premium, to pay a fixed amount of money, or
to pay expenses up to an amount stated in the contract, in the event an
expense is incurred.26
A. Health Care in the United States
The United States Constitution does not guarantee a right to health
care, and there is no obligation on the part of the federal government to
provide such care.27 For financing health care, the United States has de-
pended largely on employment-related group health insurance, supple-
mented by individual insurance policies for those who can afford them,
and various federal, state, and local programs directed at specific popula-
tions. Therefore, health insurance is offered by private or government
insurers.2 8 More specifically, coverage exists29 in private insurance poli-
cies, 30 employee welfare plans governed by the Employee Retirement In-
25. OSCAR N. SERBEIN, JR., PAYING FOR MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 75
(1953).
26. Id. Hence, '[i]nsurance has been defined as 'that social device for making accu-
mulations to meet uncertain losses of capital which is carried out through the transfer of
the risks of many individuals to one person or to a group of persons."' Id.
27. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
28. Medical care insurers may also be divided into organizations supplying services or
closely associated with suppliers of service (e.g., Blue Cross, Blue Shield, group practice
plans with an insurance feature), and organizations that are independent of the medical
profession (i.e., 'commercial insurers engaged primarily in the sale of life, fire, or casualty
insurance but also offer medical care insurance through separate contracts or riders on
other insurance policies). Serbein, supra note 25, at 78.
29. The following are the most prominent means of providing health insurance. How-
ever, there exist many funds that supply coverage which will not necessarily be explored in
this Commentary. For example, the Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) provides medical and dental benefits to dependents of
present and former members of the military. Smith v. Office of Civilian Health and Medi-
cal Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), 97 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 1996), cert.
dismissed, 117 S. Ct. 1027 (1997). However, this Commentary does use the CHAMPUS
fund as an excellent example of inconsistent judicial decisions.
30. In 1991, 178 million Americans were covered by some form of private health insur-
ance, including Blue Cross-Blue Shield plans, commercial insurance, self-funded employer
plans, or prepaid plans such as HMOs. During that same year, private health insurance
paid out $222.4 billion for health care, accounting for about one-third of national health
expenditures. Private insurance paid for nearly 35% of hospital care and over 46% of
19971
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come Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 3' and under the Federal Medicare
provisions of the Social Security Act.3 z
Today's health care financing system evolved during the past century in
response to various incentives and changing circumstances.33 The factors
that had the greatest influence on its development were changes in eco-
nomic conditions, social trends, government policies, and advances in
medical science.3 n As the country entered the twentieth century, issues of
how to improve public health and extend the new benefits of medical
science to all Americans became more important. 35 While Americans re-
jected a tax-financed national health care system, private insurance was
not an immediate choice.
The historical dynamics of the health care system have resulted in mas-
sive inflation and gaps in coverage, arguably the dominant characteristics
of American health care insurance today.36 As health care costs rise, and
defects in the system are uncovered, companies and unions continue to
agree on insurance coverage for more routine health CoStS.3 7 Govern-
ment and business leaders are becoming alarmed as the cost of private
insurance and government health programs balloons.
38
Soaring medical costs and gaps in coverage may be the most
pressing problems triggered by perverse incentives in the sys-
tem, [but] they are by no means the only problems in American
health care. The design of the system also restricts its ability to
take full advantage of the potential of some new technologies
for delivering existing services in a more efficient and cost effec-
tive manner. At the same time, the system is ill-prepared to
physician services. Almost 96 million people were covered by group policies and nearly 10
million under individual or family policies. In 1990, 81% of employees had health insur-
ance coverage, but only 42% of employers offered health insurance to its employees; many
smaller businesses do not offer health insurance as a fringe benefit. HEALTH INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INS. DATA, 1991 & 1993.
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(y) (1988).
33. Edmund F. Haislmaier, Why America's Health Care System Is In Trouble, in A
NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR AMERICA 4 (Stuart M. Butler and Edmund F. Haislmaier
eds., 1989).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 5.
36. LAURENE A. GRAIG, HEALTH OF NATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON
U.S. HEALTH CARE REFORM 17 (1993). Some argue that the background to the health
care problem involves medical education, diagnosis, hospitals, specialization, fees, and
therapeutic agents. Louis HOPEWELL BAUER, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE OR GOVERNMENT IN
MEDICINE 3-6 (1948).
37. GRAIG, supra note 36.
38. Id.
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meet the challenge of financing the new demands and new serv-
ices generated by other technologies.39
It is within this environment that experimental treatment has become a
troublesome niche.
B. Defining Experimental and the Problems with Clinical Trials
1. Insurance Providers Determine What Is Experimental
Insurers and employers routinely deny coverage for medical care
deemed experimental, unproven, unnecessary, or inappropriate. Policy-
makers in both public and private sectors increasingly find it difficult to
determine when new medical services, procedures, and technologies
cease to be experimental and become state of the art, and thus
accepted. °
Currently, thousands of self-insured employers, hundreds of insurers,
and various federal and state programs make coverage decisions indepen-
dently,41 relying on medical journals and assessments by groups of physi-
cians and scientists, results of technology assessment programs, 2 and
reviews of individual cases by an in-house or outside panel of physi-
cians.43 Some insurers have formal technology review programs in which
panels of experts review the medical literature and seek consensus,4 4
while other carriers use a lone medical director to make the decisions.
Another approach is a step-by-step process that enables a particular
treatment to qualify. 5 Unfortunately, most of the above methods are
used only by major carriers. The other 1,500 insurers and managed care
organizations usually decide whether treatment for a particular case
39. Haislmaier, supra note 33, at 32.
40. Charles Culhane, Fight Intensifying Over Paying for New Technology, AM. MED.
NEWS, Dec. 2, 1991, at 8.
41. Meyer, supra note 15, at 1. Because of antitrust concerns, each insurer or other
third-party payer must make this determination on its own. Freedman, supra note 21, at
38.
42. For example, programs are conducted by the American Medical Association and
by the HIAA. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. For example, Aetna utilizes an independent panel of 130 medical experts in
different specialties to review contested cases. Three physicians review each case and cov-
erage is approved if at least one reviewer gives the "O.K." Id.
45. As a first step toward qualifying for coverage, the "Blues" require that a medical
product or technology have final approval from appropriate regulatory bodies, such as the
Food and Drug Administration. It also requires scientific evidence to show that the tech-
nology can help in diagnosing or effectively changing the health outcome of a disease or
injury. Culhane, supra note 40, at 8.
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should be denied as experimental and investigational based solely on the
language of the insurance contract.46 The result of the various ap-
proaches used is that while one insurer considers treatment experimental,
and hence uncoverable, another insurer may allow for the treatment.
2. How Experimental Becomes Standard: The Trials47
How and when an experimental procedure becomes standard treat-
ment is often the crux of the debate over insurance coverage for any
emerging medical treatment. 48 Therapies are evaluated in clinical trials
in which there are three phases, classified according to research objec-
tives and methodology.49 The first phase, a Phase I study, starts with a
new research treatment being given to a small number of patients.5" This
involves conducting experiments on animals, as well as humans, to deter-
mine whether the treatment can be tolerated, what the appropriate dos-
age should be, and what side effects may result.51 While this phase begins
with experimentation on animals, it is continued on humans, usually
males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, with the disclaimer
that there is no therapeutic intent.52 Patients are told this before the pro-
cedure is even considered on a human being.
The second phase,53 clinical investigation,54 determines if the disease in
46. Freedman, supra note 21, at 38. These smaller payers cannot afford to undertake
extensive investigations. Id.
47. In cancer research, a clinical trial is a study conducted with cancer patients, usually
to evaluate a new treatment. Each study is designed to answer scientific questions and to
find new and better ways to help cancer patients. OFFICE OF CANCER COMMUNICATIONS,
NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, WHAT ARE CLINICAL
TRIALS ALL ABOUT? 1 (1995). While clinical trials are utilized in research for many
illnesses and diseases, the focus here will be on cancer trials.
48. Denise S. Wolf, Comment, Who Should Pay For Experimental Treatments? Breast
Cancer Patients v. Their Insurers, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2029, 2041 (1995).
49. Much of the information contained in this section of the article was obtained from
an interview with John Cova, an insurance industry consultant. See also Smith v. Office of
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), 97 F.3d
950, 953 n.3 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. dismissed, 117 S. Ct. 1027 (1997).
50. OFFICE OF CANCER COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 47, at 16.
51. Telephone Interview with John Cova, insurance industry consultant (Nov. 3, 1995).
The research treatment is well tested in laboratory and animal studies without the knowl-
edge of how patients will react. Phase I studies may involve significant risks for this rea-
son. OFFICE OF CANCER COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 47, at 16. The aim of the study at
this point is to determine: dosage; how the patient metabolizes the drug; what is the best
route of administration (intravenously or orally or both); and, what side effects are
involved.
52. Interview, supra note 51.
53. Phase II studies determine the effect of a research treatment on various types of
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the human being responds to treatment."5 Usually what is looked for is
"shrinkage" or some other clinical criteria.56 This phase can be divided
into two phases with the latter phase emphasizing adverse side effects not
apparent in earlier phases.57 It usually involves a larger number of pa-
tients but is not necessarily a representative, cross-section of the disease
patients.58
The third phase5 9 is the randomized trial phase6" which ascertains
whether the treatment is as good as or better than the existing conven-
tional treatment.61 This is a randomized trial involving the experimental
treatment and the conventional treatment, with the goal of safety and
efficacy.62 The ultimate issue here is whether the median disease free
survival time in the experimental group is superior to the control group.
63
These trials mark the last stage 64 of the clinical testing of a new treatment
required before the Food and Drug Administration will license any drug
for distribution.65 Unfortunately, many clinical trials disregard this last
phase if it is determined that phase two was a success. 66 This is unfortu-
nate because it is possible that the results in phase two could statistically
cancer. Each new phase of a clinical trial depends on and builds on information from an
earlier phase. If treatment has shown activity against cancer in Phase II, it moves to Phase
III. OFFICE OF CANCER COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 47, at 16.
54. Comment, supra note 48, at 2041.
55. Interview, supra note 51. For example, in cancer trials, this phase determines if the
drug has an effect on the cancerous tumor.
56. See, e.g., Researchers Call for Renewed Efforts in the War on Cancer, MED. &
HEALTH, Nov. 7, 1994. A key weapon in the war against cancer is support for "transla-
tional" research into cancer therapies. This research is the stage at which basic science
discoveries are first tested in humans to determine their safety and efficacy (generally pre-
clinical Phase I and/or I trials). Id. at 44.
57. Comment, supra note 48, at 2042.
58. Interview, supra note 51.
59. In Phase III, the new treatment is directly compared with the standard treatment
to see which is more effective. OFFICE OF CANCER COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 47, at 16,
17.




64. In cancer trials, the study continues to Phase IV where the new research treatment
becomes part of standard treatment in patient care. For example, a new drug that has been
found effective in a clinical trial may then be used together with other effective drugs, or
with surgery and/or radiation therapy. OFFICE OF CANCER COMMUNICATIONS, supra note
47, at 17.
65. Perspective AIDS Vaccines: A Flickering Light at the Tunnel's End, MED. &
HEALTH, May 23, 1994, at 21.
66. Interview, supra note 51.
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be insignificant, and thus inaccurate, if put to the randomized trial in-
volved in phase three.67 This concept is often misconstrued, especially by
juries.68
Currently, there are two basic routes through which randomized
clinical cancer trials can be effectuated. 69 One is performed by the Na-
tional Cancer Institute ("NCI"),7° and the other is by a privately spon-
sored trial.71
The NCI trials involve multi-center, randomized clinical trials that oc-
cur all over the country.72 To participate, the person leading the prospec-
tive trial must'submit a protocol to the NCI.7 3 The protocol is reviewed
anonymously by experts who determine whether the NCI should sponsor
the trial.74 When such a trial becomes NCI sponsored, the information
gained from the trial becomes a public good in that anyone and everyone
can benefit from the findings.75 These trials are considered first rate; the
experts who grant them are well recognized in their field. 76
Other trials are often considered "home grown," and frequently are
not as cogent.77 These trials essentially are as good as the internal review
board ("IRB") that comments on the trial.78 The IRB's duty is to for-
mally comment on, and reach conclusions regarding, the ethics and legal-
ity of the trial. It also is tasked with determining the trial's scientific
merit, although it is not obligated to. 79 Whether the privately sponsored
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Again, this really pertains only to cancer trials.
70. A nationwide effort to conquer cancer intensified with the National Cancer Act of
1971. This created the National Cancer Program which brings together a network of re-
searchers at many public and private institutions around the country. These include the
National Cancer Institute, cancer centers, universities, community hospitals and private
industry. OFFICE OF CANCER COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 47, at 19.
71. Interview, supra note 51.
72. Id.
73. Id. The doctors who conduct a clinical trial follow a carefully designed treatment
plan called a "protocol." This spells out what will be done and why. Studies are planned to
safeguard the medical and psychological health of patients as well as to answer research
questions. OFFICE OF CANCER COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 47, at 17.
74. Interview, supra note 51.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. But see Christine Gorman, Are Surgeons too Creative: New Operations Don't
Face the Same Scrutiny as New Drugs, TIME, Sept. 4, 1995, at 56. All hospitals have an
institutional review board that examines a doctor's proposal for a new procedure and
makes sure he or she publishes the results. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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trial is accurate and reliable is a difficult conclusion for insurers to make,
especially when the NCI does not make any recommendations.
According to the 1971 Cancer Act, the NCI shall monitor the safety
and efficacy of experiments.8" The NCI, however, does not desire to be a
regulator; this would entail it engaging in biomedical politics.81 Because
the NCI's support primarily comes from oncologists (its largest contribu-
tors), it naturally does not want to alienate that support.82
How then, are the research and the many trials to be sponsored?
Funding the trials through employer-sponsored insurance policies is an
option, but that is comparable to a hidden form of taxation as the re-
search is funded via covering patient care costs, and higher premiums.
83
Some argue that trials should be funded through general funds regulated
by the government.84 The "home grown" promoters prefer the funding
to come from employer-sponsored insurance because the trials then are
subject to less vigorous peer review.85 Also, such a method is a simple
and more consistent source of funding. Trials that conclude that a treat-
ment is 100% effective, however, are very expensive to cover, more so
than the trials that do not reach that level of success. Therefore, it is
logical to suspect that "home grown" trials often do not reach an opti-
mum determination of safety and efficacy.86
III. INCONSISTENCY AMONG THE COURTS
The executive and legislative branches have been very active in issues
of health care coverage. The judiciary has not sat idly in observation
either. Recognizing that insurance coverage is. provided for by a con-
tract-the insurance policy-the courts very often are used, and perhaps
abused, to interpret these contracts.
The case law involving experimental exclusions is "remarkably incon-
sistent,"87 with splits abounding among the circuit courts of appeal. In
fact, contradictions exist even within circuits. The health care industry
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Jonathan Gaw, A Question of Control, Company Struggles to Get Health
Insurers to Pay For Trials of Device that Helps Quadripilegics Use Their Hands Again, THE
PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 2, 1995, at 1H.
83. Dave Lenckus, Fight, Bus. INs., Aug. 14, 1995, at 40.
84. Interview, supra note 51.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Richard Saver, Note, Reimbursing New Technologies: Why are the Courts Judging
Experimental Medicine?, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1095 (1992).
624 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:613
has criticized the judiciary for ordering payment too often for experimen-
tal treatment.88 One can question whether the courts should even be in-
volved in such a sensitive area, or whether there is no option but to have
the courts be major participants.
Experimental exclusion cases most often arise under contract or tort
disputes. The litigation usually focuses on ambiguous terms in insurance
policies that are capable of two or more reasonable interpretations.8 9
Courts have developed several benchmarks to define experimental sta-
tus, 90 and are struggling to apply consistent standards in assessing contro-
versial technology.91 Still, different approaches are used by the judiciary
when it decides whether benefits should be denied or provided. It is use-
ful to examine these approaches to determine what steps the insurance
industry can take to avoid these disputes.
When an insured/patient is seeking reimbursement from the insurer for
an allegedly experimental treatment, there are basically three scenarios
that can be encountered. 92 The first is that the patient's insurance policy
does not contain an exclusionary provision that expressly precludes cov-
erage of "experimental" medical treatments. Second, the health insur-
ance policy may contain both an exclusionary provision and a definition
of what qualifies as an "experimental" medical treatment under that pro-
vision. The last scenario is one in which the insurance policy contains an
exclusionary provision, but lacks a dispositive definition of the term
"experimental."
When reviewing an experimental exclusion issue, courts first must look
to the organization that is providing the coverage. Courts then determine
the appropriate standard of review; this varies based upon whether the
insurance coverage is offered by a self-insured, public, or private payer.
93
For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that a denial of
benefits challenged under ERISA is to be reviewed under a de novo stan-
88. See, e.g., Franklin M. Zweig & Seymour Perry, Health Care Goes to Court: Judges
Need Access to Impartial Medical Expertise, WASH. POST, July 17, 1990, (Health Maga-
zine), at 26.
89. See, e.g., Frenderis v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 873 F. Supp. 1153, 1156
(N.D. I1. 1995).
90. Note, supra note 87, at 1106.
91. Id. at 1116.
92. Barbara A. Fisfis, Comment, Who Should Rightfully Decide Whether a Medical
Treatment Necessarily Incurred Should be Excluded From Coverage Under a Health Insur-
ance Policy Provision which Excludes From Coverage "Experimental" Medical Treatments?,
31 Duo. L. REV. 777, 779 (1993).
93. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Dynamic Engineering, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Va. Apr. 4,
1994).
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dard, unless the benefit plan expressly grants the plan administrator or
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe the terms of the plan. 4 The arbitrary and capricious standard of
review is appropriate only where an ERISA administrator is given such
discretionary authority. 95 Thus, the standard of review encompasses the
standard that the appellate court utilizes when reviewing the lower
court's decision,96 as well as the standard that trial courts use regarding
the appropriate measure with which to review the benefits under a spe-
cific plan.97
The court then considers the language of the contract in conjunction
with the questioned treatment.98 Here, a determination is made with re-
gard to who bears the burden-of proving the insured's entitlement to the
insurance coverage.99 If the disputed provision of the insurance contract
resides in the benefits section, as opposed to the exclusions section, then
the insured bears the burden of establishing entitlement to the insurance
benefits.' 00
Courts also look to the language of the contract to determine whether
the insurance contract between the parties requires coverage for a partic-
ular procedure." 1 This involves determining whether the exclusionary
94. Id. at 464.
95. Id.
96. When the district court bases its determination of whether a medical procedure
meets a contract's definition on facts presented and the opinions of experts, the question is
one of fact and appellate courts will not reverse the findings unless they are found to be
clearly erroneous. Hendricks v. Central Reserve Life Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir.
1994).
97. See, e.g., Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., No. 94-2531, 1995 WL 596172
(4th Cir. Oct. 11, 1995). The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the district court's grant
of summary judgment, and reviewed Blue Cross's denial of benefits under the ERISA plan
it administers. Id. at *1, 2.
98. See, e.g., Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249 (3d Cir. 1993).
Different standards of review govern our consideration of the district court's rul-
ing. The court's choice of the de novo standard and its definition of the term
"experimental procedure" were mixed questions of law and fact, involving the
application of legal precepts .... and the interpretation of contractual language to
determine the parties' intent.
Id. at 1254 (citations omitted).
99. It is a basic rule of insurance law that the insured carries the burden of showing a
covered loss has occurred and the insurer must prove facts that bring a loss within an
exclusionary clause of the policy. McGee v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 953 F.2d 1192,
1204 (10th Cir. 1992).
100. Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405, 1408 (7th Cir. 1994).
101. Under policies governed by ERISA, a summary plan description must be provided
to participants and beneficiaries of the plan and must be written in a manner calculated to
be understood by the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and com-
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clause is clear or ambiguous; if the clause is ambiguous, the insured
prevails, 0 z if it is clear, the court then ascertains if it can be construed to
exclude the experimental treatment. 10 3 At this point, the court has the
difficult task of determining the correct definition of "experimental.' 1 4
In any event, the case law can be examined by separating the two out-
comes, policyholder prevailing or insurer prevailing. Of course, there are
variables under both outcomes that entail what jurisdiction the case is
filed, the type of policy that is being questioned, and who the provider is
that is being sued.
Federal circuit court decisions regarding exclusionary language clauses
virtually cover the spectrum of possibilities. Timely examples of conflict-
ing approaches are Smith v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical Pro-
gram of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS),1°5 and Wilson v. Office of
Civilian Health and Medical Programs of the Uniformed Services
(CHAMPUS). °6 These cases present very similar fact situations, involve
the same health insurer with the same director, regulations, and policy
manual, but achieve completely different results.
A. Insurer Prevails
In Smith v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uni-
formed Services (CHAMPUS), the plaintiff, Smith, brought suit against
CHAMPUS and William Perry, in his capacity as Secretary of the De-
fense, challenging their refusal to pay for certain procedures recom-
mended by Smith's doctors. 10 7 These procedures were to treat Smith's
breast cancer and involved high-dose chemotherapy ("HDC"),10 s cou-
prehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and
obligations under the plan. Hendricks, 39 F.3d at 511.
102. See, e.g., Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 50 F.3d 793, 799-80 (10th Cir.
1995).
103. See, e.g., McGee, 953 F.2d at 1202.
104. See, e.g., Hendricks, 39 F.3d at 511.
105. 97 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 1996), cert dismissed, 117 S. Ct. 1027 (1997). In a footnote to
the most recent release of the circuit court's opinion, it indicates that the original opinion
was vacated and plaintiff's petition for a rehearing was granted. The court noted the con-
flict with Wilson v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical Programs of the Uniformed Serv-
ices (CHAMPUS), 65 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 1995). However, upon circulation of the court's
original opinion to the full court, a majority of the judges voted not to rehear the case en
banc. Id. at 950 n.1.
106. 65 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 1995).
107. Smith, 97 F.3d at 951.
108. This procedure is carried out in several stages. In most cases conventional chemo-
therapy is used to see if the tumor is vulnerable to the cell-killing drugs. Next, stem cells
are extracted and stored from the patient's bone marrow or circulating blood or both.
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pled with peripheral stem cell rescue ("PSCR"). 1°9 The doctors informed
Smith that her cancer had spread to her lymph nodes and that HDC with
PSCR would provide her with the best chances of survival. Neither
Smith's doctors nor the hospital, however, would commence treatment
until they received assurances that Smith had the means to pay for the
costs.110
The oncology department at the hospital filed a claim with
CHAMPUS, 111 on Smith's behalf, that outlined the particulars of her
case and made a request for pre-treatment determination as to whether
the prescribed treatment would be covered." 2 The medical director of
CHAMPUS, Dr. David Bogner, issued an initial determination that the
HDC/PSCR would not be covered as per the terms of the policy, which
does not provide coverage for treatments or procedures that are consid-
ered experimental or investigational." 3 The director invited Smith's doc-
tors to support their position, that the treatment did meet the generally
accepted standards, with documentation-such as well-designed, out-
come-based studies that have been published in refereed medical
journals.
1 14
Smith's attorney submitted a request for reconsideration along with af-
fidavits of two of Smith's oncologists along with a third who was familiar
with Smith's case."' Each doctor maintained that HDC/PSCR was gen-
erally accepted in the medical community and was not considered experi-
Then, high doses of chemotherapy drugs are given over four or five days. Afterwards, the
patient's stem cells are reinfused so that blood cells can once again be manufactured. Peta
Gillyatt, Breast Cancer: Bone-Marrow Transplants, HARVARD HEALTH LETrER, July 1,
1995.
109. Smith, 97 F.3d at 951.
110. Id.
111. This was different than how CHAMPUS usually covers its insureds. Traditionally,
CHAMPUS beneficiaries generally receive medical care first and then submit a claim.
CHAMPUS then makes an after-the-fact determination as to whether the medical care
received was a covered service. Hence, the beneficiary is "at risk" in that the medical
services may not qualify for payment under CHAMPUS. Id. at 952.
112. Id.
113. Id. The director explained that whether a treatment is experimental is determined
by whether it meets the "'generally accepted standards of usual professional medical prac-
tice in the general medical community."' This is determined by the evaluation of outcomes
of clinical trials which have been published in the medical literature. Because of the ab-
sence of such clinical trials in the medical literature, the director concluded that HDC/
PSCR did not yet meet the generally accepted standards in the general medical community
for the treatment of breast cancer. Id. at 952-53.
114. Id. at 953.
115. Id.
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mental for the treatment of breast cancer. 1 6 However, Smith's attorney
did not provide any clinical studies published in medical journals indicat-
ing general acceptance in the medical community.'l 7 Accordingly, the
director denied Smith's request for reconsideration, noting the failure to
provide the requested medical literature upon which CHAMPUS could
base a decision to provide coverage for the treatment.' 18 Smith subse-
quently filed suit.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in reviewing
CHAMPUS' appeal from the district court that found the denial of cover-
age was arbitrary and capricious, was presented with two issues in the
case. 119 The first issue was whether CHAMPUS properly interpreted its
regulations, contained in 32 C.F.R. § 199.4(g)(15), as requiring publicized
results of Phase III clinical trials in order to determine whether HDC/
PSCR met accepted professional medical standards, and thus was no
longer experimental. 2 ° Second, if the regulations were interpreted prop-
erly, the court examined whether CHAMPUS' decision to deny benefits
to Smith was arbitrary and capricious. 121 The court saw no basis in the
record for concluding that CHAMPUS' decision was arbitrary and capri-
cious, 122 and found no rational basis for the district court to cast aside the
Director's findings.' 23 Accordingly, even though it was such a "sympa-
thetic case," the Court of Appeals reversed the district court, ordering the
denial of Smith's coverage.
24
B. Policyholder Prevails
Wilson v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical Programs of the Uni-
formed Services (CHAMPUS) involves a similar fact pattern as Smith, but
an opposite result. Gail Wilson was diagnosed with breast cancer, and
her doctor recommended a series of treatments of HDC/PSCR to treat
her condition.' 25 Wilson was a beneficiary of CHAMPUS, which specifi-
cally provides coverage for chemotherapeutic agents and their adminis-
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 953-54.
119. Id. at 954-957.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 961.
123. Id. at 957-961.
124. Id. at 161.
125. Wilson v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical Programs of the Uniformed Serv-
ices (CHAMPUS), 65 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 1995).
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tration. 126  However, the CHAMPUS policy manual stated that
autologous bone marrow transplants were covered for certain diseases
under specific circumstances, although breast cancer was not listed as one
such disease.127
Dr. Bogner, the director of CHAMPUS, received and denied Wilson's
request for coverage. Again, he stated that "'in the -absence of published
randomized, prospective trials, CHAMPUS must continue to consider
this therapy as investigational for the treatment of breast carcinoma. '128
Wilson's physician and the treatment's provider would not begin HDC/
PSCR without an advance commitment from CHAMPUS to cover its
cost. Wilson filed suit.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
entered a judgment permanently enjoining CHAMPUS from denying
Wilson coverage for the desired treatment. 129 The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reviewed the criteria CHAMPUS utilized in making
such decisions involving coverage, specifically the clinical trials. The
court recognized that such tests are important in determining the validity
of medical treatments, and may be an important factor in determining
whether a particular therapy meets the generally accepted standards of
usual professional medical practice in the general medical community. It
noted, however, that nothing in the Code of Federal Regulations or the
CHAMPUS policy manual indicates that published, Phase III clinical trial
results are required before a benefit can be provided. 3 ° Consequently,
the court affirmed the decision that CHAMPUS's refusal to pay for Wil-
son's HDCIPSCR was arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance
with the law. The permanent injunction prohibiting denial of coverage
was enforced.
V. RECONCILING THE "EXPERIMENTAL" ISSUE
It is clear that litigating the issue of nonreimbursement can result in
inconsistent outcomes because the case law on experimental exclusions
remains unsettled. Such inconsistency is caused by differences in contract
language, varying postures of those involved in the litigation, and the spe-




130. Id. at 365. The court also noted that in addition to overemphasizing the necessity
of Phase III clinical trials, CHAMPUS ignored abundant evidence that HDC/PSCR is
gaining widespread acceptance within the medical community. Id.
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cific facts of each case. 131 However, as seen in Smith and Wilson, courts
do have standards with which to approach these cases. Because of the
prevalence of exclusionary provisions that specifically exclude experi-
mental medical treatments from their coverage terms, the courts have ap-
plied basic contract and insurance law principles. But when these
definitions appear in the policy, the insured-patient still has a chance to
obtain reimbursement if the court determines the insurer's definition is
ambiguous.
132
Courts evaluate every case on an individual basis. But when a court
cannot find at least the existence of confusing language in the insurance
policy, the treatment will not be covered. This can play very hard on the
minds of judges, and it is for this reason, among others, that a more suita-
ble approach should be considered in not only resolving these cases, but
avoiding them altogether.
A. Dynamics to Consider Before Making Recommendations
In a perfect world, insured-patients would be entitled to all known
medical treatments to control whatever disease or sickness from which
they suffer.133 But in a perfect world, there also would be no disease or
sickness that needs treating. Because many Americans suffer from a myr-
iad of sicknesses and diseasesa34 -AIDS,' 135 Parkinson's disease,1 36 em-
physema, 137 numerous forms of cancer (including, inter alia, leukemia,138
brain cancer, 39 skin cancer, 40 lung cancer, 41 and breast cancer),142 ath-
131. Note, supra note 87, at 1106.
132. See, e.g, Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,
529 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Pa. 1981). A provision of an insurance contract is ambiguous if
reasonably intelligent individuals, on considering it in the context of the entire policy,
would honestly differ as to its meaning, and if alterative or more precise language would
have put the meaning of the language beyond a reasonable question. Id. at 197.
133. Harris, 1992 WL 421489 *1.
134. At the risk of sounding morbid, the following provides an indication of how broad
the issue of experimental treatment has reached.
135. Florence Nightingale Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 41 F.3d
1476 (11th Cir. 1995).
136. Gorman, supra note 77, at 56.
137. Id.
138. Dexter v. Kirschner, 972 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1992).
139. Michael A. Hiltzik, When Care is Denied, L. A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995, (Home Edi-
tion), at A16.
140. Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1992).
141. Hendricks, 39 F.3d 507.
142. Wolf, 50 F.3d 793.
Experimental Treatment Exclusions
erosclerosis,'143 obesity, 44 short-bowel syndrome145 -there are a variety
of treatments being discovered and tested every day.
Along with the discovery of new treatments comes heated controversy
as insurers attempt to distinguish between experimental and standard
medical treatments, 46 consumers pressure for the acceptance of new
treatments as standard procedures, 47 and physicians just try to treat their
patients. Because the realization of new technology can no longer be
supported through health-care coverage, 148 much of the controversy gets
settled through litigation. The logical inquiry that follows from these re-
alities involves what can be done to avoid such litigation. The answer
should be easy: make the language of coverage exclusions for experimen-
tal treatments clear, 149 and establish guidelines and procedures by which
proposed treatments can become accepted. In this way, insureds will
know how and when they will be covered, doctors will know exactly when
their procedure has become conventional, and insurers can keep the costs
of insurance reasonable. This is, however, much easier said then done.
An awareness of how courts settle these disputes can shed light on how
to avoid such problems. Courts apply general insurance law and contract
principles in experimental exclusion cases. 150 A court observes the cover-
age language, and considers only whether the disputed medical treatment
falls within the scope of the insurer's definition of precluded experimen-
tal procedures.' 5' Keeping in mind the general rule that when a health
insurance policy expressly precludes coverage of experimental medical
treatments and defines what types of treatments qualify as experimen-
tal, 52 a court will not inject into its analysis of the case its own opinion of
what is experimental.' 53 One of two results should occur. If the treat-
ment qualifies as experimental, then the court will find for the insurer and
143. Friedrich v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 894 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1989).
144. Exbom v. Central States, 900 F.2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1990).
145. Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315 (7th Cir. 1993).
146. Matthew P. Schwartz, Experimental Debate is Intensifying, NAT'L UNDERWRITER
LIFE & HEALTH, Apr. 24, 1995.
147. Id.
148. Gina Kolata, When Doctors Say Yes and Insurers No, 69 MED. ECON. 87 (1992).
149. Charles J. Steele, Plans: Make Language of Coverage Exclusions for Experimental
Treatments Clear, 4 MANAGED CARE OUTLOOK 12 (1992).
150. Jennifer Belk, Comment, Undefined Experimental Treatment Exclusions in Health
Insurance Contracts: A Proposal for Judicial Reform, 66 WASH. L. REV. 809, 812 (1991).
151. Comment, supra note 92, at 780.
152. See Zuckerberg v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 108 A.2d 56 (S.D.
N.Y. 1985).
153. Comment, supra note 92, at 780.
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deny the insured/patient's claim for damages.154 Conversely, if the treat-
ment does not qualify under the policy's definition as being experimental,
then the insured-patient's claim will prevail and the insurer will have to
pay for or reimburse the insured/patient for the medical expenses.!
55
Most often, the disputed language in an experimental exclusion is un-
clear. When contract ambiguities exist, courts construe the equivocal lan-
guage against the insurer. 56 "'The court generally has to err on the side
of coverage because it's the insurance company that writes the policy,
chooses the words, and markets the coverage.'"1 57 This approach exists
because insurers have more control over contract p'ovisions and greater
bargaining power than insureds.'58 Also, this approach attempts to force
insurers to disclose all relevant information so that insureds can fully un-
derstand the contract terms.' 59 Only fully informed insureds can make
rational purchases with regard to the extent of their coverage. Along
these lines, coverage clauses are interpreted broadly while exclusion
clauses are construed narrowly.
1 60
Experimental exclusions are drafted inadequately by insurers even
with the threat of a contract being construed against them. Many believe
that insurers are using the experimental label more often as an excuse to
avoid paying for accepted treatments.' 61 This argument may be valid
when insurers use undefined exclusions-then opportunities for insurer
manipulation can arise.' 62 Undefined exclusions create uncertainty about
coverage because no agreement on what constitutes experimental treat-
ment exists. This uncertainty about an insurer's willingness to pay medi-
cal bills may influence the patient's or physician's decision about whether
to seek treatment.' 63 The threat of litigation often acts as an effective
deterrent to enforce a possible legitimate use of.health care resources.
Given the expense of some experimental treatments, there is a finan-
cial interest that complements insurer's decisions to categorize treatments
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Comment, supra note 150, at 815.
157. Holoweiko, supra note 20, at 41.
158. R. Keeton, INSURANCE LAW BASIC TEXT § 6.3(a) (1971).
159. Comment, supra note 150, at 815.
160. McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 440 (N.D. Cal.
1983). "'Exclusion clauses had better exclude everything because, by definition, anything
that's not excluded is included."' Holoweiko, supra note 20, at 41.
161. Findlay, supra note 10, at 80.
162. Comment, supra note 150, at 821.
163. Grumet, Health Care Rationing Through Inconvenience, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED.
607 (1989).
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as experimental.'" There is no doubt that many of the questioned treat-
ments are very expensive;1 65 health insurers are having difficulty keeping
up with the coverage requests. There are fewer and fewer health care
dollars to spend each year and more and more to spend them on; insurers
can no longer afford to support the diffusion of new technology through
health care.166
Even with the legitimate claim that treatment costs are rising, technol-
ogy assessment is an area that can be manipulated quite easily. What is
experimental to one person, is standard treatment to another. 167 Incon-
sistencies that exist from one insurer to the next regarding what is cov-
ered creates added uncertainty, 68 as does inharmonious coverage for
treatment of one disease and not a different disease calling for the same
treatment. 169 Adding to the inconsistencies is the fact that many proce-
dures are not studied rigorously. 71 In fact, within the three phase clinical
trial procedure, the third phase might be skipped when positive results
are realized on the second phase. 17  It can be reasoned that change
would be good for this area of the law.
Because much of the uncertainty in insurance reimbursement litigation
is due to the fact that the judiciary is being forced to make decisions in an
area in which it is, arguably, unqualified, 72 the question of what can be
done to end the chaos that faces the insurer and the insured/patient re-
mains.173 What exists certainly is chaotic, "you can't imagine what it's
like to go through one of these coverage battles.'
174
164. Comment, supra note 150, at 821.
165. See, e.g., Dexter, 972 F.2d at 1114. The average cost of an allogenic'bone marrow
transplant at the University Medical Center in Tucson, Arizona is $170,000. Id.
166. Kolata, supra note 148, at 88.
167. Holoweiko, supra note 20, at 41.
168. Findlay, supra note 10, at 81.
169. Most Blues plans cover large dose chemotherapy treatment when it is used against
advanced leukemia or lymph-system cancer, but not for breast cancer. Findlay, supra note
10, at 81.
170. See Faltermayer, Medical Care's Next Revolution, FORTUNE, Oct. 10, 1988, at 126.
171. See supra note 58.
172. The judiciary has little medical background but is making medical decisions which
unquestionably have life and death consequences. Comment, supra note 92, at 782
173. Reconciling the apparent conflict between payers and providers is becoming in-
creasingly difficult. Charles Culhane, Fight Intensifying Over Paying for New Technology,
AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 2, 1991, at 8.
174. Richard A. Knox, Expensive New Treatments Cause Dispute With Insurers, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 22, 1994, at 13.
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B. Relieve Tensions Between Insurers and Insureds
Insurance companies do not want to pay for experimental treatments
or therapies that are not proven to be safe and effective.' 75 Heartless
greed most often is not the motivating factor for the denial of coverage.
Some insurance companies even fault doctors and hospitals by claiming
they are too eager to profit in various ways by prematurely pushing new
technologies. Clearly, the ultimate goal for all involved is to produce
treatment that will cure. After achieving this goal, hopefully the doctors'
and insurers' goals of profiting financially while providing quality treat-
ment can be realized as well. The first step is to understand the common-
ality of purpose that exists among all those involved in an attempt to
work together to solve the problem.
C. Improve Funding
The process by which experiments become conventional must be re-
vised. The current state of NCI sponsorship, private sponsorship, and
trial and error through insurance company funding is not adequate. This
method of research is the root of the whole problem, as this is where the
largest amounts of money are needed. It also is where the most impor-
tant decisions are made, especially with regard to what protocols are cho-
sen to be funded to go through the trial process.
One proposal has emerged that would empower a national board to
decide not only what gets covered, but what treatment receives funding in
an attempt to realize its effectiveness. This board would inject consis-
tency, fairness, and coherence into the funding process. The goal here
would be to achieve reliability on a greater scale than currently exists.
Because of the many different trial processes a protocol can be placed
into, it is not uncommon for there to be varying standards as to what is
considered safe and effective. The current standard primarily involves
publication and peer review. While this provides an adequate forum for
criticism and suggestion, there is no real enforcement behind it. The fact
that an experimental treatment is examined by others in the medical field
does not necessarily prevent the initiator from proceeding with its admin-
istration despite harsh criticism from his "peers." While this lack of en-
forcement would be resolved in the courts eventually, it should never
have to get that far.
With the organization and empowerment of a national board to mea-
175. David S. Hilzenrath, Insurers "Arbitrary" on Breast Treatments, WASH. PosT, Feb.
17, 1994, at Al.
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sure objectively the safety and efficacy of a treatment, and further decide
on the funding of its research without bias, a greater, more reliable level
of care could be provided. Also, a more efficient process could be devel-
oped to decrease the lag time that currently is inevitable as technology
gains acceptance in the medical community. By decreasing the proce-
dural hurdles a new treatment must jump over to get funding, a quicker
determination can. be made of what experimental procedure is valid and
what treatment is not worthy of further research. This in turn would con-
serve the limited research funds for only those treatments that have a
genuine likelihood of success when put to the test.
D. Remove Judicial Subjectivity From the Process
Currently, judicial review occupies the primary role of resolving reim-
bursement litigation. It is inevitable, even with the most consistent and
equitable procedures, that cases will arise regarding reimbursement and
the unfairness of a particular exclusionary clause. While it would be most
ideal to relieve the burdens of these decisions from the judicial system
completely, it is unrealistic that this would ever happen. Therefore, ob-
jective criteria should be developed, standard in all jurisdictions, by which
to measure an exclusionary clause.
First, if there is no exclusionary clause, then the insurer automatically
should lose. It is troubling to think that an insurance company could im-
pose its own subjective interpretation of the insurance contract, where
there exists legitimate confusion or absence of a clause, on an insured
with, most likely, limited resources with which to enforce the contract.
Hence, without any definition as to what is experimental, or without any
such clause, the contract should be read in favor of the insured-patient.
Where there does exist a definition of the term "experimental," the use
of independent medical experts by the court would enable the most ob-
jective decisions regarding the questioned clause to prevail. While this
method imposes a burden on the adversary process by infringing on coun-
sel's ability to present and argue the case as he sees fit, it is an acceptable
casualty. This objectivity would allow some of the burden to be relieved
from judges and placed into the hands of those who are better suited to
evaluate issues like this.
V. CONCLUSION
General insurance law and contract principles require insurers to de-
fine fully their coverage exclusions, especially those for experimental
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treatment. The process of defining and interpreting these exclusions,
however, is a long and arduous one. It begins with an idea that pro-
gresses into a clinical trial with continuous research. This trial is then
used to treat patients who desperately need the treatment. Finally, when
the trial is discovered by a patient or doctor, an attempt to apply it to an
insurance policy occurs; then the policy's coverage is litigated. While this
is what numerous exclusionary clauses go through, it should not be the
case.
Litigation involving who should pay for experimental treatment usually
turns on judicial interpretation of policy language. However, the judici-
ary, while an institution designed to resolve disputes, has not been en-
tirely able to harmonize its decisions regarding experimental treatment.
This can and does create uncertainty about what treatments will eventu-
ally be covered, if at all. This uncertainty can foster adversarial relation-
ships between insurers and physicians, hospitals and insureds. Thus, it is
evident that a mechanism by which treatments can be definitively consid-
ered experimental, or medically accepted, should be established to pro-
vide assurance to health care providers and insureds. This would be the
goal of a national board comprised of neutral examiners.
It is important to emphasize that an attempt should be made to avoid
litigation. A national board, while not removing decisions from the judi-
ciary when lawsuits do occur, should strive to decrease litigation, and
when necessary, provide a framework for judges to decide what is experi-
mental and what is conventional. Along these lines, objective criteria
would need to be established by which insurers, health care providers,
insureds, and judges could ascertain the "acceptance level" of certain
treatments. The aspiration of neutral examiners would be to improve ef-
ficiency and accuracy by encouraging the use of clear, specific, identifi-
able language. Thus, striving for safety and efficacy should be an
exclusionary clause's goal, not litigation.
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